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court in the Harmon case cited with approval the quotation in State v.
Cutshall27 from Alonzo v. The State28 which explains the reason for
such a holding. That is, if one of the parties after exercising due care,
was mistaken as to a matter of fact which, had it been true, would have
rendered the alleged criminal act legal and innocent, the party so acting
under such mistake of fact would be innocent of crime. So there is some
basis for the inference that the Supreme Court might not find a person
in the situation of the husband in the Harmon case guilty of bigamy. It
certainly seems that this rule is the more logical and reasonable. To
prosecute a man for bigamy who has done all that is legally required to
get a valid divorce, and is acting in reliance upon an order of the court
granting the divorce at the time he remarries, is not reasonable or just.
It seems that a person who has acted in good faith should be entitled to
rely upon a supposedly valid divorce decree without fear of criminal
prosecution.

%PARxs

ALLEN ROBERTS

Execution-Supplemental Proceedings or Creditor's Bill in North
Carolina
Under the dual system of courts of law and equity that existed in
North Carolina prior to 1868, the judgment creditor had to resort to his
bill in equity' to reach property of the judgment debtor that was not
liable to execution at law. All the debtor's property was liable for his
debts excelit his legal exemptions. 2 But only legal interests in tangible
personalty and realty, equities of redemption, and interests under a passive trust could be reached by execution at law.8 Legal interests in intangibles and equitable interests other than those pointed out above had
to be reached by a creditor's bill in equity. The remedy in equity was
4
not available to a creditor who had not exhausted his legal remedies.
In 1868, a statutory procedure known as supplemental proceedings
was adopted whereby the judgment creditor could subject to sale certain
of the judgment debtor's property which could not be reached under
execution at law.5 . Although ' ostensibly this statute was intended to
completely replace the creditor's bill, the question arose as to whether
109 N. C. 764, 14 S. E. 107 (1891).
'15 Tex. App. 378 (1910).
..
'Also called creditor's suit, creditor's bill, and judgment creditor's bill' (to
distinguish it from general creditor's bills with which we are not here concerned).
Since the fusion of courts of law and equity, the courts frequently call thi§
proceeding
an action.
2

N. C.

GEN. STAT.

§§ 1-369 et seq. (1953).

N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-315 lists property that is subject to levy and sale under
execution. Here we are concerned only with property not so subject.
'Wheeler v. Taylor, 41 N. C. 225 (1849).
' CODE OF CIV. PROC. §§ 264 et seq. (1868).
Now N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-352'

1-368 (1953).
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it excluded a creditor's bill entirely or whether either could be used at
the creditor's option.
In McKeithan v. Walker6 it was held that supplemental proceedings
could not be used but a creditor's bill was necessary to subject the
judgment debtor's interest in a resulting trust in land to the satisfaction
of his debt. In that case the judgment debtor, prior to the institution
of the action in which the judgment was recovered, transferred land to
one Brown under a deed of trust to secure certain debts. The judgment
was docketed and an execution issued and returned unsatisfied. Then,
by supplemental proceedings, the plaintiffs, judgment creditors, obtained
an order for the examination of Brown. Finding that he held the land of
the judgment debtor under the deed of trust, the plaintiffs asked for a
decree to require the trustee to sell the land held in trust and after paying
the debts and costs provided for in the deed of trust, to pay the surplus
to plaintiffs on their executions. In holding that the interest of the
judgment debtor could not be reached by supplemental proceedings but
only by an action in the nature of the former creditor's bill in equity, the
Court, after concluding that the debtor's interest in the resulting trust
was subject to the lien of the docketed judgment under N. C. GE. STAT.
§ 1-234, said: "We think the purpose of the Code was to give those
remedies [supplemental proceedings] to a plaintiff only in case the defendant had no known property liable to execution, or to what is in the
nature of execution, viz: Proceedings to enforce its sale for the satisfaition of the debt, sufficient in value to satisfy the debt ....
If there be
a lien on property, it must be shown either by a sale of the property or
by affidavit that the property is insufficient in value to satisfy the debt."'
In Rand v. Rand,8 the Court used very strong language to the effect
that the bill in equity was abolished and that a judgment creditor's only
remedy was by supplemental proceedings. 9 The McKeithan case was
then considered and the Court concluded that if the decision in that case
was the proper construction of the Code in respect to cases where supplemental proceedings would not lie and the party would have to resort
866 N. C. 95 (1872).
Id. at 98.

878 N. C. 12 (1878).

o "If we clearly ascertain what is a 'supplementary proceeding' as established.
by our Code, its scope and end, we shall have done much to settle the present and
similar questions of jurisdiction. We think it clear that proceedings supplementary
to execution under the Code of Procedure are a substitute for the former creditor's
bill. . . . The only purpose of the creditor's bill was to enforce satisfaction of a
judgment out of the property of the judgment debtor when an execution could not.
reach it, and the only purpose of supplementary proceedings is to obtain the same.
ends by the same means. The bill in equity has been abolished and nothing is
substituted in its place but the proceedings supplemental to the execution and in-aid,
of it. The office -%fthe former is now performed by-the latter, and it would be
inadequate, and the parties would be in many cases without remedy, unless it could
be applied in the same cases and to the same extent by taking hold on all the,
property and rights of the debtor out of the reach of an execution at law, and
applying them in discharge of the debt." Id. at 14.
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to a creditor's bill, then a creditor's bill would be necessary to reach the
judgment debtor's equitable interest in real estate, 10 whereas supplemental proceedings were proper to reach a like interest in personal
property. The Court intimated disapproval of the distinction drawn in
its interpretation of the decision in McKeithan v. Walker but did not
disapprove it expressly. The holding of the Rand case in which the
judgment creditor sought to subject to the payment of the judgment a
distributive share of a personal estate in the hands of administrators to
which the judgment debtor was entitled, was that the creditor's bill
could not be maintained, but the plaintiff's only remedy was by supplemental proceedings."
The Rand interpretation of the McKeithan decision was spelled out
and followed in McCaskill v. Lancashire1 2 where the identical issue was
before the court. McKeithan v. Walker was followed in other cases
where the court required the judgment creditor who was seeking the aid
of supplemental proceedings, to show by affidavit or otherwise the nonexistence of any equitable estates in land within the lien of the judg3

ment.1

It is important to note that all the cases discussed above were decided
between 1868 and 1883 under the Code of Civil Procedure adopted in
1868. In the Code of 1883 there appeared some changes 14 in the chapter
on Proceedings Supplementary to the Execution which were apparently
designed to abrogate the holdings of these cases. As far as pertinent to
"oBecause the docketed judgment constituted a lien on equitable interests in real
property by the construction of N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-234.
" The plaintiff had started a new action in the same court in which she would
have had to start supplemental proceedings; the deviation from supplementary
proceedings was more in form than substance. The Court refused to dismiss the
action but allowed the plaintiff to amend as to form. This allowed the plaintiff
to keep the benefit of the restraining order on the administrators, one of whom
was the insolvent judgment debtor.
1 83 N. C. 393, 399 (1880). "The result of the cases, including the late case of
Rand v. Rand, 78 N. C. 12, is that judgment creditors must resort to supplementary
proceedings, as provided for in the Code, in all cases except the single one of a
judgment operating as a lien on equitable estates in land which cannot be sold on
execution, and may commence such proceedings even in that case upon affidavit of
the insufficiency of the property affected by the lien to pay the judgment; but
otherwise, the proceedings to enforce the lien of a judgment on equitable interests
in land not liable to execution under the act of 1812 must be by action in court,
and the proceeds applied, if sufficient, before the judgment debtor can be subjected
to supplementary proceedings. The line of distinction is distinctly drawn, and now
well known and generally conformed to in the profession. And, as less circuity
is made by the action in court than would be by a receiver on supplementary
proceedings, who would have to bring an independent action and then report back
to the clerk in the cause for final orders, we are inclined to stand by the decision in
McKeithan v. Walker in the limited application it has to equitable interests in
land." [Emphasis added.]
Hinsdale v. Sinclair, 83 N. C. 339 (1880).
14 These changes were added by the code commissioners in their revision, by
virtue of the authority in N. C. SEss. LAWS 1881, c. 145 and 315 and N. C. SEss.
LAws 1883, c. 191. The pertinent changes were in § 488 par. 2 and § 493.
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this discussion these changes in the Code now appear in N. C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 1-353 and 1-362. Future references will be to these sections.
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-353 deals with the order of examination of
the judgment debtor and/or others who might be indebted to him. The
change was an addition which reads: ".

..

And the judgment creditor is

entitled to the order of examination under this and the preceding section,
although the judgment debtor has an equitable estate in land subject to
the lien of the judgment .... ." This addition clearly dispensed with a
5
requirement of the affidavit held necessary in Hinsdale v. Sinclair,' and
6
it has been so held.'
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-362 concerns the Court's authority to order the
application of property of the judgment debtor to his debt. It reads in
part: "The Court or judge may order any property, whether subject or
not to be sold under execution... to be applied towards the satisfaction
of the judgment. . .

."

The clause "whether subject or not to be sold

under execution" was the addition to this section. Although no authority has been found to support this position, it is the opinion of this writer
that the purpose of this addition was to nullify the holding in the
McKeithan case and subsequent cases relying on it as authority.
According to these cases, the only instance in which a creditor's bill
was proper was where a judgment operated as a lien on equitable estates
in land which could not be sold on execution. It is submitted that the
clause "whether subject or not to be sold under execution" was intended
to include such property interests, thus eliminating the one instance in
which a creditor's bill was necessary and making supplemental proceedings the remedy in all cases. As pointed out above, the change that appears in N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-353 was held to dispense with the necessity
of showing in the affidavit for the order of examination the non-existence
of any equitable estates in land subject to the lien of the judgment. The
reasons for this requirement in the affidavit were stated in Hinsdale v.
Sinclair to be ".

.

. to indicate the necessity of the remedy in point of

justice to the creditor, as an assurance to the court against the invocation of its aid to an idle end, and as a protection to the debtor against the
discovery of his private affairs from the curiosity or other unworthy
motive of the creditor."' 17 Why eliminate this requirement if the creditor
still has to resort to a creditor's bill to reach such interest? The requirement was eliminated even though the purported reasons for it still existed.
1583

10

N. C. 339 (1880).

The First Citizens National Bank of Elizabeth City v. Hinton, 213 N. C.
162, 195 S. E. 359 (1938); Boseman v. McGill, 184 N. C. 215, 114 S. E. 10 (1922) ;
The Farmers and Mechanics National Bank of Westminister v. Bums, 109 N. C.
105, 135 S. E. 871 (1891) ; Hackney Bros. v. Arrington, 99 N. C. 110, 5 S. E. 747
(1888). But see Magruder v. Shelton, 98 N. C. 545, 4 S. E. 141 (1887), where
the court followed Hinsdale v. Sinclair on this point. Apparently the change in
the Code was not brought to its attention.
""83 N. C. 339 at 343 (1880).
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The creditor could invoke supplemental proceedings even where such
property interest existed by presenting affidavit proof of its insufficiency
to satisfy the judgment.' 8 Factors worthy of note are that the changes
in the two sections were made at the same time and the general purpose
of the Code to give more complete relief in one action.
The circuity of action objection raised in McCaskill v. Lancashire
might be answered by observing that the court could order the sale of
such property and allow other interested persons to interplead in the
supplemental proceedings.' 9
Whatever might have been, the courts have not held that supplemental
proceedings was the exclusive remedy for a judgment creditor whose
judgment could not be satisfied at law. An examination of some of the
cases decided since 1883 will reveal that the courts have neither made
supplemental proceedings the exclusive remedy nor strictly followed the
distinction indicated above as to when the use of each remedy is proper.
In Trimble v. Hunter,20 the Court said that the plaintiff had to
proceed by creditor's bill to enforce the lien on a resulting trust in
defendant's favor. 21 The Court held in Everett v. Raby22 that the right
in equity of defendant to call for a conveyance of land for which he paid
the purchase money was not subject to sale under execution and said
that the remedy of the creditors was an action in the nature of a bill in
equity to subject the land to the payment of their debts. In Cooper v.
The Adel Security Co.,23 the judgment creditor brought an action in the
nature of a creditor's bill to have an account stated of the assets and
liabilities of a corporation. The only assets were unpaid stock subscriptions which the Court said were a trust fund for the benefit of creditors.
The lower court dismissed the action as to defendant stockholders because there had been no personal service on defendant Security Co. The
Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the action was error and thereby said in effect that the creditor's bill was the proper remedy. If the
law was as stated in McCaskill v. Lancashire supplemental proceedings
would have been mandatory under these facts. There are, of course,
cases in which supplemental proceedings were used to reach a property
interest of the judgment debtor that was not subject to sale under
24
execution.
18
McKeithan v. Walker, 66 N. C. 95 (1872).
"9 Wilson v. Chichester, 107 N. C. 386, 12 S. E. 139 (1890) ; Munds v. Cassidy,
98 N.
C. 558,
S. E.10 353
20104
N. C.4 129,
S. E.(1887).
291 (1889).
21 See also Mayo v. Staton, 137 N. C. 670 at 686, 50 S. E. 331 at 337 (1905)
where the Court in referring to the lien on a resulting trust in land, created by the
docketing of the judgment, said: "The lien can be enforced only by judgment
rendered in a civil action." The holding of the case was that this interest was not
subject to sale under execution.
22104 N. C. 479, 10 S. E. 526 (1889).
23122 N. C. 463, 30 S. E. 348 (1898).
Boseman v. McGill, 184 N. C. 215, 114 S. E. 10 (1922) (cash and securities
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In Monroe Bros. & Co. v. Lewald,25 the Court held it error to
dismiss supplemental proceedings when there was a creditor's bill (which
the court assumed to be a judgment creditor's bill instead of a general
creditor's bill) pending by another person and intimated that both creditor's bills and supplemental proceedings would be proper to reach some
types of property interests, by saying that the two proceedings should be
consolidated when they conflict, as where the same property is sought to
be subjected. In McIntosh Grocery Co. v. Newman,2 6 the Court said
that both remedies were still open to claimants in proper instances.
In the recent case of Corneliusv. Albertson,27 the plaintiff, a judgment
creditor of defendant, had an execution issued against the trustee of a
trust of which the defendant was the beneficiary. The res of the trust was
personal property. The trustee was not a party to the suit. The Court
said: "The plaintiff cannot reach by the execution she had issued the
property held in trust for defendant .... but must endeavor to reach it,
if she can, by a supplemental proceeding .... ,28

[Emphasis added.]

It is apparent from the foregoing cases that the Court has not always
required strict compliance with the clear cut rule stated in McCaskill v.
Lancashire. No case has been found, however, in which it was held
error to allow the remedy required by that rule.
WILLIAm G. RANSDELL, JR.
Judgments-Collateral Attack on Judgment Regular on Its Face
1
a husband sought to have his marriage
In Carpenterv. Carpenter,
annulled on the ground that a decree of divorce obtained by his spouse
from her former husband was a nullity. The allegations were that the
wife, having falsely sworn that she had lived separate and apart from
her former husband for two years, failed to meet the statutory requirements2 which thereby invalidated her divorce and rendered her marriage
to the plaintiff without legal efficacy. The North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's denial of the wife's motion to strike the
allegations. In refusing to permit the plaintiff to attack collaterally the
prior decree, the Court said:

held by another person) ; Johnson Cotton Co., Inc. v. Reaves, 225 N. C. 436, 35
S. E. 2d 408 (1945) (an interest in a judgment recovered against another).
'"107 N. C. 655, 12 S. E. 287 (1890).
26184 N. C. 370, 114 S. E. 535 (1922).
2T244 N. C. 265, 93 S.E. 2d 147 (1956).
28Id.at 268, 93 S.E. 2d at 150. At the same page the Court, when referring to
the Supplemental Proceedings statute (N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-352 et seq.), said, "...
the provisions of this article are intended to supply the place of a proceeding in
equity, where relief was given after a creditor has determined his debt by a judgment at law and was unable to obtain satisfaction by process of law."
1244 N. C. 286, 93 S. E. 2d 617 (1956). See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-4 and
as to annulment.
§ 51-3
2
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950).

